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dialog between the authors. This allows us both to focus on the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The labels “partner” and “partnership” enjoy a special place in our 
culture and in our law.1 Literature is replete with usages of the terms, 
almost always in a positive light.2 In recent years, the terminology of 
partnerships has been used in a wide variety of settings to describe 
relationships of equality, including domestic partnerships, community 
partnerships, government-industry partnerships, and virtually any 
relationship in which goals are shared and at least some measure of 
mutual participation is the norm. As Webster’s puts it, “partner” is “one 
who shares in the possession or enjoyment of something with another,” 
or, more broadly, “one of two or more persons who play together in a 
game against an opposing side.”3 
In law, although “partnership” is a specific term defined in the 
partnership statutes, the appeal of “partner” and “partnership” 
classifications are sufficiently strong that individuals associated in firms 
that clearly are not partnerships nevertheless describe their firms as 
partnerships and their colleagues as partners.4 Members of professional 
associations such as law firms commonly refer to colleagues as 
“partners” even though “shareholders” or “members” would be more 
accurate terminology for the large number of firms organized as 
professional corporations or limited liability companies, organizational 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture and the Lore of Partnership: 
Of Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 793 (2005) (exploring the special status of “partner” in law and 
literature). 
 2. A prime example is Mark Twain’s Poor Little Stephen Girard, which describes 
the unsuccessful attempts of a boy to become a partner to “the bank man.” See MARK 
TWAIN, POOR LITTLE STEPHEN GIRARD (1879), reprinted in CARLETON’S POPULAR 
READINGS, 183-84 (Anna Randall-Diehl ed. 1883). 
 3. Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 900 (Tex. 2009) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW 
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1996)). 
 4. Cf. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex 
Post Illusions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 121 n.95 (2005) (“Business people 
regularly use the words partner or partnership to describe a close business relationship 
regardless of the nature of the underlying contract. Purchasing people regularly refer to 
their supplier-partners, for example. In that language game, partner has no legal 
significance. Lawyers, using the word in the legal language game, choke every time 
they see this, understanding that calling someone a partner may mean that someone else 
may rely on that characterization, and later invoke the law that says partners are mutual 
agents of one another.”). 
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forms quite distinct from partnerships. Moreover, a simple Google 
search will reveal that countless corporations use the term “partners” in 
their names5 even though the presentation of a corporate entity as “XYZ 
Partners, Inc.,” for example, signals a certain confusion of identity. 
LLCs are no less attracted than corporations to the appeal of partnership 
terminology.6 
Indeed, considering the years of experience the law has had to 
refine concepts underlying partnerships, it is somewhat surprising to 
encounter a rather straightforward question on which the contemporary 
law provides no clear answer: Is it possible to have a partnership 
consisting of one person—a partner without a partner? The question will 
arise for any two person partnership when one of the partners leaves the 
partnership. It will also arise whenever a number of partners leave with 
only one partner remaining. When only one partner remains, can the 
resulting business or firm be described as an “association” or a 
“partnership?” On the most fundamental level, is it not the case that a 
partnership is a relationship between or among individuals? 
Traditional partnership law rendered the partnership a very fragile 
relationship, with the consequence that any change in the membership 
dissolved the partnership.7 Whether the partnership consisted of two or 
two hundred partners, the departure of a single partner caused the 
dissolution of the partnership. Though potentially disruptive, this 
approach was consistent with the view of partnership as a unique 
association of individuals combining their efforts in a quest for profits. 
Highly personal and specific in its composition, the association could 
not survive a change in its membership. Thus, the law firm with two 
hundred partners necessarily re-formed as a new partnership each time a 
partner joined or left the firm.8 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. For example, a Google search for “partners, inc.” reveals a number of 
corporations that have identified themselves in this way. See http://www.google.com 
(search “partners, inc.” then follow “search” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2012). 
 6. Likewise, a Google search for “partners, LLC” produces a number of such 
instances, including JP Morgan Partners, LLC, Berkshire Partners, LLC, Graystone 
Partners, LLC, Triton Partners, LLC, and so forth. See http://www.google.com (search 
“partners, LLC” then follow “search” hyperlink) (last visted Mar. 22, 2012). 
 7. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 29 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 349 (1914) (defining dissolution as 
a change in the relationship among partners caused by a partner ceasing to be associated 
in the carrying on of the business). See generally Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied 
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative 
Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1982). 
 8. See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of 
Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30-58 (1988). See generally Donald J. 
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The fragility of partnerships was thought to be a major 
disadvantage of the partnership form of organization.9 In an effort to 
provide greater stability for partnerships, the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (“RUPA”) adopts an entity approach to partnerships that 
allows many of them to survive the withdrawal or other dissociation of a 
member.10 In particular, the goal is to implement the intent of partners 
who have contracted for stability. For example, the death of a partner 
and the withdrawal of a partner from a partnership that was formed for a 
fixed term are not events that, standing alone, trigger a dissolution and 
winding up of a partnership.  
But what if the death or withdrawal of a partner represented the 
departure of one partner from a two person partnership? This raises the 
issue that is the focus of this Article: May a two person partnership that 
loses a partner continue to operate as a partnership? More specifically, 
must the business be liquidated or may the survivor buyout the recently 
departed partners and continue the business? The question is 
fundamental and important. It also is one to which RUPA does not 
provide a clear answer. In this article, we explore the issue and suggest a 
framework that may be helpful in resolving issues that arise when the 
penultimate partner leaves a two person partnership. 
We have structured much of the discussion as a dialog between the 
authors. This allows us both to focus on the precise issues under RUPA 
presented by a single person partnership and to probe the competing 
arguments concerning whether such a partnership may exist. We 
conclude the article on common ground with a suggested resolution for 
the single person partnership buyout issue raised by RUPA. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA & Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 885-97 
(1997). See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 4.3.2 (2008 
Supp.), for a discussion of ways that law firms have attempted to avoid harsh 
dissolution consequences.  
 9. See generally Donald J. Weidner, Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some 
United States Experience, 26 J. CORP. L. 1031, 1031-33 (2001) (discussing RUPA and 
early attempts to eliminate altogether the term dissolution). 
 10. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801, 6 U.L.A. 189-90 (1997) (listing events 
that cause a partnership dissolution). See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. 
VESTAL & DONALD J. WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 443-51 
(2010-11 ed.). 
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A DIALOG 
Hillman: Perhaps we should start with RUPA’s definition of a 
partnership because this bears on the question of what remains following 
the withdrawal of a partner from a two person partnership. The core of 
RUPA’s definition is that a partnership is “an association of two or 
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . .”11 If 
one partner leaves, the association of two or more persons no longer 
exists, which means a partnership is constituted only for the limited 
purpose of winding up the business.12 In other words, the partnership 
that existed prior to the dissociation is no more. 
The status of the partnership following the withdrawal is a point of 
practical, as well as theoretical significance. To conclude that the 
partnership ceases to exist may negate the RUPA buyout, which is 
triggered only by a dissociation that does not result in a partnership 
dissolution and winding up.13 Is it not a de facto dissolution when the 
partnership ceases to exist because there is only a single partner? If so, 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6), 6 U.L.A. 61 (emphasis added). The full 
definition provides: “‘Partnership’ means an association of two or more persons to 
carry on as co-owners a business for profit formed under Section 202, predecessor law, 
or comparable law of another jurisdiction.” Id. 
 12. This is exactly the conclusion reached in the small but growing number of 
cases concluding that the dissociation of a partner from a two person partnership 
necessarily triggers dissolution of the partnership. See Corrales v. Corrales, 2011 WL 
3484470 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (responding to the suggestion of a single-person 
partnership by saying “no such animal exists.”); Wheatley v. Fink, No. C048328, 2006 
WL 3071451, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2006) (holding that buyout provisions do not 
apply when one partner leaves a two-person partnership because the partnership could 
not be continued by a single partner); Vesco v. San Diego Cmty. Corr. Ctr., No. 
D049266, 2008 WL 2547890, at *7 (Cal. App. Mar. 25, 2008); Kuist v. Hodge, No. 
B193863, 2008 WL 510075, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008); Pemstein v. 
Pemstein, No. G030217, 2004 WL 1260034, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 9, 2004); Costa 
v. Borges, 79 P.3d 316, 320 (Idaho 2008) (holding that ‘‘because it takes at least two 
persons to have a partnership’’ a two person partnership does not survive the 
withdrawal of a partner, but concluding a joint venture cannot survive the withdrawal of 
a member even if it has more than two participants). See also Eschweiler v. Eschweiler, 
No. A05-1435, 2006 WL 1890646, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 11, 2006) (holding that 
partner who has given notice of dissociation under an agreement that includes a buyout 
provision is not barred by the election of remedies doctrine from subsequently 
demanding judicial dissolution and winding up); Rules of the State Bar of Cal., R. 
3.179 (2010) (“The State Bar must terminate certification of a limited liability 
partnership if there is only one partner in the limited liability partnership . . . .”). 
 13. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 701, 6 U.L.A. 175-76 (1997). See generally 
HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 10, at 413-27. 
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then perhaps the withdrawal of the partner should not result in a RUPA 
buyout, with the consequence that the partnership instead should 
proceed down the dissolution track, wind up and liquidate its assets. To 
be sure, the concept of de facto dissolution is novel in partnership law, 
but no mechanism exists to accomplish the end of a partnership other 
than dissolution of the partnership. If dissolution and winding up are the 
consequences of a withdrawal, then by definition the statutory buyout is 
not applicable. 
Weidner: I agree that it is a good idea to begin with the text of 
RUPA’s definitions of partnership. We also should consider the purpose 
and limitations of those definitions.  
 RUPA has two definitions of “partnership.” One is a short version 
and the other is a long version. The short version expressly refers to the 
long version because the short version is incomplete without it.14 The 
short version is Section 101(6), which provides that “‘Partnership’ 
means an association . . . formed under Section 202 . . . (emphasis 
added).”15 The short version’s reference to Section 202 is to the longer 
version of the definition, which has two principal parts. First, Section 
202(a) provides that “the association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not 
the persons intend to form a partnership (emphasis added).”16 Second, 
Section 202(b) provides that “[a]n association formed under a statute 
other than this [Act] . . . is not a partnership under this [Act] (emphasis 
added).”17 In particular, “[a] limited partnership is not a partnership 
under this definition.”18 Thus, the short version of the definition in 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6), 6 U.L.A. 61 (1997). Section 101(6) is 
one of three of RUPA’s fourteen definitions that refer to other provisions of RUPA and 
are incomplete without them. This is a technique perhaps most familiar to tax lawyers. 
See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006) (stating that “gross income means all income from whatever 
source derived . . . .”) No one would look to § 61 alone as a dispositive definition of 
what constitutes income. 
 15. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6). 
 16. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a), 6 U.L.A. 91 (1997). The Official 
Comments to Section 202 make clear that the drafters considered it the long form 
definition of partnership. Official Comment 1 discusses what 202 adds to the UPA 
“‘definition’” of partnership and notes in particular the language “whether or not the 
persons intend to form a partnership.” REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt. 1, 6 
U.L.A. 93 (1997). 
 17. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(b). 
 18. Id. § 202 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 93. This is a major change from the UPA definition, 
which expressly applied the UPA “to limited partnerships except insofar as the statutes 
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Section 101(6) is incomplete without the Section 202 language 
excluding limited partnerships and all other associations organized 
under other formation statutes. This reflects the partnership statute’s 
modest but historic role of serving as a residual category. If a business 
relationship is not formalized under any other statute—if there is 
nowhere else to turn—the partnership statute controls. 
Consequently, the statutory definition of “partnership” exists only 
to describe the broad catchment area of the relationships that will be 
brought within the ambit of the partnership statute. Stated differently, 
the definition simply describes in general terms the relationships that 
will trigger the application of the statute’s mandatory and default rules. 
Both the short and the long versions of the definition build off the term 
“relationship,” which in this context has always meant a voluntary 
coming together to co-own a business.19 Neither definition states 
anything about the consequences of the relationship. With one important 
exception, other sections define the consequences that follow if the 
relationship falls within the statutory catchment. 
The exception is that both definitions refer to something being 
“formed.”20 The work of telling us what has been formed, and the 
consequences from the moment of formation to the extinguishment of 
the relationship are left to other sections. Perhaps the broadest and most 
powerful consequence of the formation is the creation of a legal entity. 
Section 201(a) declares that the formation of a partnership results in the 
creation of a business entity, stating that “[a] partnership is an entity 
distinct from its partners.” 21 The question then becomes: what are the 
rules that govern entities that are formed by the relationships that fall 
under and are subject to RUPA? More specifically, the question 
becomes: what are the rules that wind down or extinguish the existence 
                                                                                                                                         
relating to such partnerships are inconsistent.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(b) (1997), 6 
U.L.A. 393 (1914). This major departure from the UPA was intended to lay the 
foundation for free-standing limited partnership acts. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 
202 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 93 (1997). 
 19. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1), cmt. 1 (“In the domain of private law the term 
association necessarily involves the idea that the association is voluntary.”). 
 20. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101(6), 202(a); see also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP 
ACT § 202(c). Cf. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 7 (discussing when a partnership “exists” rather 
than when a partnership is “formed.”). 
 21. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a). Professors Hansmann and 
Kraakman argue that the law should recognize the partnership with only a single 
partner, citing but not discussing RUPA and conceding that historically a partnership 
must have at least two partners. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387, 413-14 (2000). 
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of those entities? As a preliminary matter, I have no problem saying that 
the entity resulting from the relationship continues until the business is 
liquidated or the penultimate partner is bought out. 
Hillman: You know you have a problem when a statute defines the 
same term twice, especially when the definitions are not identical. In 
determining when a partnership exists, referencing Section 202 is 
helpful but not dispositive because the section deals exclusively with 
formation of a partnership. Section 101(6) defines “partnership” and is 
not so limited. Note the definition employs both present and past tenses, 
providing that “[p]artnership means as association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit formed under 
Section 202, predecessor law, or comparable law of another 
jurisdiction.” 
We see the present tense used to describe what currently is (or is 
not) a partnership and the past tense used to set forth the circumstances 
of creation. Whether a partnership was ever formed is tested under 
Section 202, but the section offers no help in post-formation issues 
relating to the continuing status of a business as a partnership. Section 
101(f), on the other hand, is relevant to post-formation inquiries because 
it defines the status of what exists today. I think you go too far in 
limiting the definitional section to formation of a partnership. 
To apply this to our problem of a single person partnership, we may 
have a partnership properly formed by two individuals (Sections 101(f) 
and 202) who intend the partnership to exist for a defined term, but at 
some subsequent point prior to the expiration of the term one of the two 
partners has left the partnership (i.e., has dissociated). Since we have 
only one remaining partner, can we say that presently we have an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit? I think the question answers itself, but we obviously disagree 
on this point. 
Let’s move beyond the definition to the ramifications of concluding 
a single person partnership is, or is not, a partnership. One of the 
practical implications of the rather theoretical point we are addressing is 
whether the innovative buyout provisions of RUPA Section 701 will 
apply when one partner dissociates from a two person partnership that is 
for a fixed term. Section 801’s events of dissolution for a fixed term 
partnership do not include dropping below a minimum of two partners 
or otherwise failing to meet the definition of a partnership, so it would 
seem that the precondition for the Section 701 buyout (a dissociation 
that does not result in dissolution and winding up) applies. 
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Weidner: I obviously think you are asking the definition of 
“partnership” to do too much by effectively operating as a special 
dissolution rule whenever partnerships no longer meet the language of 
the definition. RUPA contains three separate articles on partnership 
breakups, defining when and how liquidations versus buyouts are to take 
place. To attach to the definition substantive breakup consequences 
would create yet another set of dissolution rules and certainly was not 
considered in the drafting of the RUPA.22 
Thanks in part to your scholarship,23 the RUPA drafters were well 
aware that a partnership statute must address carefully four main points 
about partnership breakups. First, it must define how to wind down the 
authority of a departing partner to bind the partnership.24 Second, it must 
wind down the departing partner’s fiduciary duties and obligations.25 
Third, it must wind down the liability of a departing partner for 
continuing partnership obligations.26 Fourth, it must “cash out” the 
equity of the departing partner, or of all of the partners. In particular, it 
must decide whether the cashing out is accomplished by a liquidation of 
the partners or by a buyout of the departing partner.27 
RUPA’s breakup provisions are much more detailed than the UPA 
on how a departing partner is to be cashed out. Articles 6 (“Partner’s 
Dissociation”), 7 (“Partner’s Dissociation When Business Not Wound 
Up”) and 8 (“Winding Up Partnership Business”) define two different 
routes and when they are to be taken.28 Article 6 introduces the new term 
“dissociation,” which it fails to define but which might best be thought 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. See generally Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 27 (1993); Edward S. 
Merrill, Partnership Property and Partnership Authority Under the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, 49 BUS. LAW. 83 (1993) (Merrill was intimately involved with the 
drafting project and his article makes no mention of attaching substantive breakup 
consequences to the definition of partnership). 
 23. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1987); Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the 
Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanency of Partnerships 
and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 24. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 702, 704 (in the case of a buyout) and §§ 
804, 805 (in the case of a winding up). 
 25. See id. § 603(b)(2)-(3). 
 26. See id. §§ 703-704 (in the case of a buyout) and §§ 805 and 806 (in the case of 
a winding up). 
 27. See id. § 701 (in the case of a buyout) and § 807 (in the case of a winding up). 
 28. Article 6 includes §§ 601-603, Article 7 includes §§ 701-705 and Article 8 
includes §§ 801-807. 
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of as a departure.29 Most simply, a partner dissociates from a partnership 
either by giving it notice of his express will to withdraw30 or by dying.31 
Section 603(a) is a “switching” provision that tells us that either one of 
two sets of rules will apply to cash out a departing partner.32 If a 
partner’s dissociation results in “dissolution and winding up of the 
business, [Article] 8 applies, otherwise, [Article] 7 applies.”33 As stated 
perhaps more helpfully in the Official Comments, “after a partner’s 
dissociation, the partner’s interest in the partnership must be purchased 
pursuant to the buyout rules in Article 7 unless there is a dissolution and 
winding up of the partnership business under Article 8.”34 
The departure of the penultimate partner in a term partnership does 
not result in a dissolution and winding up under Article 8.35 Section 801, 
by its terms, lists the “only” events that cause dissolution and winding 
up,36 and a departure from a term “partnership” is not on the list. Both 
Sections 603(a) and 801, therefore, require a buyout in this situation. 
Hillman: I share your discomfort with converting the definitional 
provision into yet another set of breakup rules. We face a gap in the 
statute, however, and I am also uncomfortable with allowing a business 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 164 (1997). 
  RUPA dramatically changes the law governing partnership breakups and 
dissolution. An entirely new concept, “dissociation,” is used in lieu of the UPA term 
“dissolution” to denote the change in the relationship caused by a partner’s ceasing to 
be associated in the carrying on of the business. “Dissolution” is retained but with a 
different meaning. The entity theory of partnership provides a conceptual basis for 
continuing the firm itself despite a partner’s withdrawal from the firm. See id. § 601 
cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 164. 
  Interestingly, RUPA itself does not define either “dissociation” or 
“dissolution.” The Official Comments, however, state that dissolution “is merely the 
commencement of the winding up process.” Id. § 801 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 190. 
 30. See id. § 601(1), 6 U.L.A. 163. A partner has the power to dissociate by 
express will at any time, even if the dissociation is wrongful. Id. § 602(a), 6 U.L.A. 
169. 
 31. See id. § 601(7), 6 U.L.A. 164. Section 601 lists ten different events that cause 
the dissociation of a partner. 
 32. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 603(a). 
 33. Id. § 603(a), 6. U.L.A. 172. Official Comment (1) states that “Section 603(a) is 
a ‘switching’ provision.” Id. 
 34. Id. § 603 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 172 (emphasis added). 
 35. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801. 
 36.  See id. § 801, 6 U.L.A. 189. Section 801 of RUPA prefaces a list of six events 
by stating that “[a] partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, only 
upon the occurrence of any of the following events . . . .” (emphasis added). Id.  
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to continue to operate with the status of a partnership when it no longer 
meets the fundamental characteristics of the partnership so succinctly 
outlined in the definition. 
On a more practical note, it seems we agree that the buyout 
provisions of RUPA should apply when a partner in a fixed term 
partnership dissociates and leaves a single, surviving partner. This puts 
us at odds with the small but growing number of recent cases that have 
concluded that the buyout provisions should not apply because the 
partnership no longer exists.37 
Let’s move beyond the buyout question and consider whether the 
business that is continued by the single “partner” may be a partnership. I 
am not arguing for a “special dissolution rule” but merely pointing out 
that whatever remains after the dissociation of a partner from a two 
person partnership does not fit the definition of a “partnership.” Again, 
the question has important practical ramifications. Suppose, for 
example, that one partner withdraws from a limited liability partnership. 
May the surviving partner continue the business as an LLP and thereby 
continue the limited liability benefits of this associational form? More 
broadly, if the partnership does not continue with only a single partner, 
by what means is the original partnership brought to a conclusion?   
We have noted that Section 801 provides an exclusive list of events 
that cause a dissolution and winding up of partnership business. The 
problem is that RUPA does not define the term “dissolution” or 
otherwise provide a context for its use. I know you gave a great deal of 
thought to dissolution issues as you were drafting RUPA and ultimately 
concluded the term dissolution caused more mischief than good and 
should not be used in the statute. You made a very thoughtful and 
persuasive argument to advance this view.38 Unfortunately, your view 
did not carry the day with the consequence that the term dissolution was 
inserted into RUPA after the basic structure of the act had been settled. 
We need to determine how and whether dissolution bears on our 
single person partnership issue, but before going too far down that road 
it would be helpful if you could provide a little background on how 
dissolution was incorporated into RUPA and what the term might mean. 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 38. See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform 
Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427,435-36 (1991). 
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Weidner: Even prior to the UPA, the term “dissolution” had caused 
confusion in the law of partnerships.39 The UPA tried unsuccessfully to 
resolve the confusion both by defining what dissolution was and by 
defining what dissolution was not. Dissolution was “the change in the 
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in 
the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the business.”40 
“Dissolution” was distinguished from “termination,” which did not take 
place until the winding up of the business was complete.41 In short, 
under the UPA, “dissolution” was a contraction in scope of the 
relationship during which authority, liability and fiduciary duties were 
wound down and proper payment was made. Despite the concept’s 
simple elegance, it continued to cause confusion. In particular, the 
“change in the relation” caused by “any partner ceasing to be 
associated” suggested more instability than many partners had 
contracted for in the continuation provisions of their partnership 
agreements. Essentially, the UPA failed to outline the consequences of 
different kinds of dissolutions. It failed to distinguish departures that 
would result in a buyout of a departing partner from those that would 
result in a liquidation of the business.42 
More than a century had been spent trying in vain to make the term 
“dissolution” work, and it seemed like a terrible failure of the legal 
imagination to insist that the law could not proceed without it. For the 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 
626-27 (1915). According to Dean William Draper Lewis, the Reporter who saw the 
UPA to completion, “[t]he subject of the dissolution and winding up of a partnership is 
involved in considerable confusion principally because of the various ways in which the 
word ‘dissolution’ is employed.” Id. 
 40. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 29, 6 U.L.A. 349 (1914). 
 41. Id. § 30, 6 U.L.A. 354. 
 42. Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform 
Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 437-38 (1991) states: 
The problem with the UPA’s use of the term “dissolution” is clearly much more 
fundamental than the absence of explicit definitions. The problem is with the way 
dissolution is defined and the role it is given in the statute. The basic problem with 
dissolution under the UPA is that it reflects an aggregate conception of partnership 
that fails to recognize the stability of partnerships as business organizations. The UPA 
actually destabilizes many partnerships, particularly those that have continuation 
agreements. The UPA suggests that the partnership business is coming to a close 
when it may not be. All that may be coming to a close is one person’s participation. In 
short, the UPA does not adequately distinguish between a departure that triggers a 
winding up of the business from a departure that does not. 
Id. 
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bulk of the RUPA project, drafts of RUPA simply eliminated the term 
“dissolution.” Indeed, the State of Texas adopted as its new partnership 
act a close-to-final version of RUPA that made no mention of 
“dissolution.” That close-to-final version reflected RUPA’s basic and 
ultimate approach, which begins with the broad concept of a 
“departure,” referred to as a “dissociation.” It then distinguishes 
departures that would cause a winding up of the business from 
departures that result only in a buyout of the departing partner. By 
making this clear and sharp distinction, RUPA was designed to provide 
stability to partnerships, especially to those partnerships that had 
contracted for stability. In the language of RUPA, a partner is 
“disassociated” when the partner expresses a will to withdraw or when 
the partner is removed by death or otherwise.43 If a dissociation is on the 
list of events that will trigger a winding up of the business, Article 8’s 
winding up rules apply. If no event takes place that will cause a winding 
up, most simply because the partnership has a continuation agreement 
that governs the situation, the buyout rules in Article 7 apply.44 
For most of the RUPA project, Article 8 simply listed the events 
that would “cause a winding up.” As Reporter, I was asked, near the 
very end of the project, to reinstate the term “dissolution” because the 
statute sounded to some members of the Drafting Committee too much 
like a radical change in the law without it (even though the Texas 
drafters and legislature had not thought so). I was asked, “How can you 
possibly have a partnership statute that doesn’t provide for 
‘dissolution?’” So, I reinstated the word in a way I thought would show 
that it was not necessary. Whenever an earlier draft had said that an 
event caused a “winding up,” I caused the new draft to say that the event 
caused a “dissolution and winding up.” As thus deployed, the term 
“dissolution” is a redundancy that refers to the occurrence of an event 
that triggers the beginning of the winding up of the business.45 If there is 
no triggering of a winding up, there is no dissolution and vice versa. To 
emphasize, unlike under the UPA, a departure that triggers a buyout 
rather than a winding up is a dissociation that does not entail a 
dissolution. Unfortunately, the Drafting Committee liked the way I 
reinstated the term dissolution and directed that I make the reinstatement 
                                                                                                                                         
 43. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601, 6 U.L.A. 163 (1997). 
 44. See id. § 603(a), 6 U.L.A. 172. 
 45. See id. § 801 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 190. (“Under RUPA, ‘dissolution’ is merely the 
commencement of the winding up process.”).  
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permanent.46 Instead of deleting the historically troubled concept, RUPA 
gave it a more restrictive meaning and left both it and the new term 
dissociation undefined. 
Hillman: I don’t share your view that dissolution is a “historically 
troubled concept.” To the contrary, its use in the UPA nicely captured 
the essence of a partnership as a relationship among individuals that 
does not survive the departure of any of the partners.47 This reflected a 
contractual view of partnerships that for centuries has been a core and 
settled feature of partnership law.48 
That said, I appreciate that the traditional view of dissolution has 
caused mischief in some extreme cases,49 and for this reason I can 
understand the appeal of enhancing stability by emphasizing the 
partnership as an entity rather than a relationship of individuals, 
particularly when there are many partners.50 The greater emphasis on 
entity over relationship required that RUPA either discard the term 
“dissolution” or offer an entirely new definition. For reasons you 
explain, RUPA did neither and leaves us in an unsatisfactory position by 
retaining the term but using it in a new, ambiguous and confusing way. 
In any event, the key point is that dissolution is not an independent 
concept under RUPA but instead is intertwined with winding up. With 
this in mind, in Section 801 we see a fairly straightforward list of events 
that trigger the “dissolution and winding up” of the partnership. If there 
is no agreement as to term, the withdrawal (dissociation) of a partner 
initiates the winding up of the partnership, and this result occurs 
regardless of the number of partners in the original partnership. If there 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. See Donald J. Weidner, Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some United 
States Experience, 26 J. CORP. L. 1031, 1031-33 (2001). 
 47. See Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian 
Knot with Continuing Partnership Entities, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7-10 
(1995). 
 48. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP AS A 
BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE WITH OCCASIONAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM CIVIL LAW AND FOREIGN LAW § 2 (1841). 
 49. See, e.g., Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 
1985) (holding that a “new” partnership resulting from the death of a partner did not 
have standing to enforce a title insurance policy issued to the “old” partnership because 
the old partnership had dissolved). 
 50.  See generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely-Held Business Through the 
Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (2005); Gary S. Rosin, The 
Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 
ARK. L. REV. 395 (1989). 
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is an agreement for a term for the partnership, however, the withdrawal 
of a partner normally will not trigger dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership. 
Let’s get specific. Suppose our two person partnership operated 
under an agreement establishing a partnership term of ten years. In the 
third year, one of the partners dissociates, leaving a single partner. There 
does not appear to be a Section 801 event that requires a winding up of 
the partnership, which would suggest that the original partnership may 
continue with a single partner. In this case, I take it that you believe the 
original partnership continues with a single partner until the expiration 
of the agreed term (ten years). 
Weidner: Yes, at least if the buyout takes ten years.51 
We have already established that a departure from a term 
“partnership” does not cause a “dissolution and winding up”52 that 
would conclude with a termination of the partnership.53 What we have is 
simply a dissociation that does not trigger the beginning of a winding 
up. Rather, the dissociation of a partner triggers the beginning of the 
winding up of the relationship of the dissociated partner to the 
continuing partnership. The Official Comments to RUPA state that the 
dissociated partner “has a continuing relationship with the partnership 
and third parties as provided in Sections 603(b) [dealing with the 
dissociated partner’s right to participate in management and fiduciary 
duties], 702 [dealing with the dissociated partner’s power to bind the 
partnership for two years] and 703 [dealing with the dissociated 
partner’s continuing liability for partnership obligations and exposure to 
liability for new transactions for up to two years].”54 The Comment also 
notes Section 403(b), under which the dissociated partner has a 
continuing right of access to books and records.55 I am quite comfortable 
treating the dissociated partner as a partner for limited purposes. 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. See REVISED UNIF P’SHIP ACT § 701(h), 6 U.L.A. 176 (1997). In general, a 
partner who leaves early has no right to be paid any portion of the buyout price until the 
agreed term ends. Id. However, the partner could receive an earlier payment if “the 
partner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that earlier payment will not cause 
undue hardship to the business of the partnership.” Id. 
 52. Id. § 801, 6 U.L.A. 189. 
 53. Id. § 802(a), 6 U.L.A. 197 (“The partnership is terminated when the winding up 
of its business is completed.”).  
 54. Id. § 701 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 176. 
 55. See id. § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 140. RUPA talks of “former partners,” with no 
special rule for dissociated partners. Id. 
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Treating the single-person term partnership as continuing until the 
completion of the buyout of the penultimate partner is consistent with 
one of the fundamental policy decisions behind RUPA. RUPA was 
designed to provide greater stability to partnerships, particularly to 
partnerships that have contracted for stability. Section 103(a) states the 
general rule of the supremacy of the partnership agreement.56 The major 
purpose of the distinction between the buyout and the winding up was to 
make sure that agreed-upon terms would be honored. Thus, even though 
a partner may dissociate at will from a term partnership, the partner has 
no right to be paid the buyout price “until the expiration of the term or 
undertaking, unless the partner establishes to the satisfaction of the court 
that earlier payment will not cause undue hardship to the business of the 
partnership.”57 
Treating the single-person term partnership as a continuing entity 
has ample precedent in federal income tax law. The general tax rule is 
that “an existing partnership shall be considered as continuing if it is not 
terminated.”58 The situation is somewhat complicated because a 
continuing partnership may either liquidate the interest of the departing 
partner or a continuing partner may purchase it.59 Suffice it to say for 
present purposes that tax law has long provided for the tax treatment of 
payments to liquidate the interest of a retiring or deceased partner.60 The 
Regulations on liquidating distributions provide that although “[a] 
partner retires when he “ceases to be a partner under local law,” the 
partner “will be treated as a partner until his interest in the partnership 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. See id. § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 73. RUPA provides that, in almost every situation, 
“relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are 
governed by the partnership agreement.” Id. The only exceptional situations are in 
subsection (b)’s list of mandatory rules, none of which apply here. Id. 
 57. Id. § 701(h). The deferred payment “must be adequately secured and bear 
interest.” Id. 
 58. I.R.C. § 708(a) (2006). I.R.C. § 708(b)(1) provides: 
a partnership shall be considered as terminated only if— 
(A) no part of any business, financial operation, or venture of the partnership is 
carried on by any of its partners in a partnership, or 
(B) within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50% or more of the total 
interest in the partnership capital and profits. 
Id. 
  A liquidating distribution is not a sale or exchange within the meaning of 
Section 708(b)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii). 
 59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1). 
 60. I.R.C. § 736. 
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has been completely liquidated.”61 Similarly, the partnership, too, will 
be seen as continuing and its taxable year will be held open.62 The 
regulations explicitly provide that the partnership continues even if one 
member of a two-person partnership either retires or dies.63 The 
partnership terminates only when the interest of the retiring or deceased 
partner is liquidated. The Code’s definition of partnership in the plural, 
as a “syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated 
association”64 is not seen as a bar to the pragmatic solution. 
Hillman: You emphasize the importance of an uncompleted buyout 
in assessing the status of the partnership following the penultimate 
partner’s dissociation. I disagree. Whether the partnership continues for 
purposes of keeping the fiction of the partnership alive should not 
depend on whether the buyout has been completed. 
In essence, you argue that until the buyout is complete there is not a 
single person partnership because of the ongoing relationship between 
the surviving partner and the dissociated partner awaiting additional 
payments. Admittedly, a dissociated partner is a partner for some limited 
purposes but not for others. This point is discussed in the Official 
Comments, which note that the “consequences of the partner’s 
dissociation do not all occur at the same time.”65 The key limited rights 
and obligations of the dissociated partner that you cite, however, are not 
dependent on whether the buyout has been completed or is pending. 
Without regard to the status of the buyout, the partner upon dissociation 
loses the power to bind a partnership that is not being dissolved,66 has 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. Treas. Reg. § 1-736-1(a)(1)(ii). 
 62. Id. § 1-736-1(a)(6). 
 63. Id. 
A retiring partner or a deceased partner’s successor in interest receiving payments 
under section 736 is regarded as a partner until the entire interest of the retiring or 
deceased partner is liquidated. Therefore, if one of the members of a 2-man 
partnership retires [and] is to receive payments under section 736, the partnership will 
not be considered terminated . . . . Similarly, if a partner in a 2-man partnership dies, 
and his estate . . . receives payments under section 736, the partnership shall hot be 
considered to have terminated upon the death of the partner . . . .  
Id. 
 64. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2). 
 65. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 164. 
 66. See id. § 702 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 181 (except under limited circumstances as to 
third parties not knowing of the dissociation). 
466 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
sharply limited rights to inspect books and records,67 and is not liable for 
new claims arising in the course of the partnership business.68 
Importantly, the buyout price is tied to the value of the partner’s 
interest as of the date of dissociation, which fixes the claim of the 
former partner and eliminates profit sharing, a key element of 
partnerships.69 This is buttressed by RUPA’s requirement that the former 
partner be indemnified “against all partnership liabilities” regardless of 
whether the buyout has been completed.70 To be blunt, the dissociated 
partner is not much of a partner at all and certainly is not enough of a 
partner to support a view of the resulting entity as anything other than a 
business in which there is only one owner. 
A significant shortcoming of RUPA is the gap it creates between 
the definition of a partnership (something that is an association of two or 
more persons) and the dissolution and winding up provisions that fail to 
address a dissociation that results in a single surviving partner. I agree 
that a policy objective of RUPA is to enhance the stability of 
partnerships, but I question whether the goal of stability is paramount to 
a degree that we should recognize as a “partnership” a business that is 
best described as a sole proprietorship. We may call a banana an apple, 
but it is still a banana. 
Of course, there would have been a happy marriage between the 
policy you favor and the statutory language if the definition of 
“partnership” provided something along the following lines: 
“Partnership” means an entity formed by the association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . .” If RUPA 
had so provided, we would not be having this discussion. 
Weidner: I think we both agree that the key issue is what RUPA 
says about the departure of the penultimate partner from a term 
partnership. More precisely, the issue is RUPA’s default rule when the 
parties have agreed upon the term but have not agreed upon what is to 
happen when there is only one partner who wants to honor it. The 
departure from a term partnership is not on the exclusive list of events 
that cause a winding up of the business. Therefore, both Section 801 and 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. See id. § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 140 (allowing “former partners” access to books and 
records pertaining to the period in which they were partners). 
 68. See id. § 703(b), 6 U.L.A. 183 (indicating that this occurs only under limited 
circumstances and when third parties were unaware of the dissociation). 
 69. See id. § 701(b), 6 U.L.A. 175. 
 70. Id. § 701(d), 6 U.L.A. 175. 
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Section 603(a) state that there will be a buyout.71 I would not resort to 
either definition of “partnership” to answer the question. 
You insist that the definition is an obstacle that must be set aside. If 
I am forced to address it in this situation to reach the result I think is 
compelled by other statutory language and by good policy, I am 
perfectly comfortable doing so by saying that the partnership, albeit 
attenuated, continues at least for the limited purpose of completing the 
buyout. Other personal liabilities, rights, duties, or obligations may be 
extinguished before or after the completion of the buyout. 
Your comments, of course, force me to answer the much more 
fundamental question: is there still a partnership after the buyout is 
complete? My answer is yes. The partnership entity continues the 
business. This is easier to see now that Section 201(a) states that “[a] 
partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”72 When the 
penultimate partner leaves, the survivor becomes the sole occupant of 
the entity. Even without statutory support, this was the result reached at 
common law in the case of the survivor in a joint tenancy.73 The last 
remaining joint tenant’s “right of survivorship” was conceptualized as 
the result of becoming the sole remaining occupant of the joint tenancy 
entity.74 However, there is no doubt that this result would be clearer if 
RUPA defined partnership as you have suggested. 
In fairness to your point, RUPA provides a way for the sole 
remaining partner to get title out of the partnership and into a sole 
proprietorship. In so doing, it arguably deems a transfer of equitable title 
to a sole proprietorship. Section 302(d) provides: “[i]f a person holds all 
of the partners’ interests in the partnership, all of the partnership 
property vests in that person.”75 Accordingly, that person “may execute 
a document in the name of the partnership to evidence vesting of the 
property in that person and may file or record the document.”76 On the 
one hand, this seems to be an enabling provision that is not listed in 
                                                                                                                                         
 71. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 801, 603(a). 
 72. Id. § 201(a), 6 U.L.A. 92. 
 73. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, 6-7 (1952). 
The right of survivorship is not considered to be a type of future interest. It is based 
on the concept that the estate is held by a fictitious entity made up of the cotenants 
collectively and that the entity continues so long as any of the joint tenants survive. 
The last survivor, of course, owns the whole estate in severalty because he no longer 
shares the estate with his former cotenants. 
Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 302(d), 6 U.L.A 104 (1997). 
 76. Id. § 302 cmt. 6, 6 U.L.A. 105. 
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Section 103(b)’s mandatory rules. On the other hand, the Official 
Comments state that, when one person holds everything, “the 
partnership no longer exists as a technical matter.”77 Indeed, “[w]hen a 
partnership becomes a sole proprietorship by reason of the dissociation 
of all but one of the partners, title vests in the remaining ‘partner,’ 
although there is no ‘transfer’ of the property.”78 
Hillman: Section 302(d) certainly supports my view that single 
person partnerships cannot exist under RUPA, but it does not clinch the 
argument. As you point out, the section is not mandatory in application 
and is subject to a contrary agreement among the partners. My view is 
that such a contrary agreement cannot validate the continuation of a 
partnership that has only one partner. 
The key issue in our discussion is how much emphasis should be 
placed on RUPA’s definition of a “partnership.” I place more emphasis 
than you do on the definition, but I also feel the definition ties in nicely 
with the policy underpinnings of RUPA and supports the conclusion that 
a partnership must have at least two partners. Unquestionably, RUPA 
gives greater stability to partnerships, and one of the means to 
accomplish this objective is by granting entity status to the partnership. 
A five, twenty, or four hundred person partnership that dissolves with 
the departure of a single partner creates conceptual problems and, in 
some cases, practical difficulties. The two person partnership, however, 
presents a distinct problem and requires special treatment. 
Suppose we have a single person partnership and the sole partner 
dies. Now, we have no partners, but we do have an entity. Are we to 
conclude the entity may continue the business and need not dissolve? 
What is it in RUPA that dictates the conclusion that there must be one 
but not necessarily two partners? If we draw an analogy to corporations, 
every corporation must have at least one shareholder. There are reasons 
to support applying the corporate analogy and to require someone to 
own the entity, and further given the history of partnerships and their 
fundamental and definitional characters as businesses owned by more 
than one person, it makes greater sense to require a partnership to have a 
minimum of two partners. Such an interpretation in no way undermines 
the entity status of partnerships or the efforts of the RUPA drafters in 
giving greater stability to partnerships generally. The two person 
partnership is a special case and distinct from a partnership with more 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
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than two owners. When a partner dissociates from a two person 
partnership and the surviving partner becomes, in your words, “the sole 
occupant of the entity,” we have a sole proprietorship, not a partnership. 
Let’s consider the limited liability partnership and whether it raises 
additional concerns. Assume there is a two person LLP, with an agreed 
term and no remedy in the event of a premature departure. In the third 
year, one partner dissociates, leaving a single partner. I take it you 
would allow the surviving partner to continue the business as a limited 
liability partnership. 
Weidner: Yes I would, although I acknowledge there is an added 
level of complication. As between the last remaining partner and the 
penultimate partner, I think the issue of the buyout versus the winding 
up is the same. On the other hand, LLP status obviously affects the 
rights of third parties. Statutory language describes the “shield” of the 
LLP without ever using the term. The core provision is Section 306(c), 
which takes a belt-and-suspenders approach to state when a limited 
liability partner is not liable. First, it states that an obligation of an LLP, 
“whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of 
the partnership.”79 Second, it states that a partner in an LLP “is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or 
otherwise, for such a partnership obligation solely by reason of being or 
so acting as a partner.”80 In short, RUPA grants a corporate-type liability 
protection81 provided that there is registration and at least pro-forma 
notice of LLP status in the name of the firm.82 Section 1001(d) explicitly 
provides that the “status of a partnership as a limited liability partnership 
remains effective, regardless of changes in the partnership, until [the 
statement of qualification] is canceled pursuant to Section 105(d) or 
revoked pursuant to Section 1003.”83 
With one possible exception, there is no policy reason why the 
shield should disappear because only one partner remains. Stated 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. Id. § 306(c), 6 U.L.A. 117. 
 80. Id. RUPA leaves it to the Official Comments to state when the partner is liable, 
providing that “[a]s with shareholders of a corporation and members of a limited 
liability company, partners remain personally liable for their own personal 
misconduct.” Id. § 306(c) cmt. 3, 6 U.L.A. 118. 
 81. See HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 10, at 513. 
 82. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 1002, 6 U.L.A. 245 (1997) (“The name of a 
limited liability partnership must end with ‘Registered Limited Liability Partnership,’ 
‘Limited Liability Partnership,’ ‘R.L.L.P.,’ ‘L.L.P.,’ ‘RLLP,’ or ‘LLP.’”). 
 83. Id. § 1001(d), 6 U.L.A. 239. A partnership becomes a limited liability 
partnership by filing a statement of qualification. See id. § 1001(c), 6 U.L.A. 239. 
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differently, why should the sole surviving partner be subjected to a 
penalty of the loss of the shield simply because the penultimate partner 
has breached his agreement and left prematurely? Conversely, why 
should the partnership creditors get a windfall in the form of 
unbargained-for personal liability of the surviving partner who has 
suffered a breach at the hands of the penultimate partner? The only 
policy reason I can think of assumes that the use of the LLP form is 
itself a representation that there is more than one person inside the 
entity. Since the entity is created to limit liability, that does not seem to 
matter. A corporate shield does not disappear when only one 
shareholder remains. 
Hillman. We agree that dissociation of a partner from a two person 
partnership does not trigger a dissolution and winding up unless it is an 
at-will partnership. We differ, however, on whether the partnership 
continues following the dissociation. I believe the partnership ends 
without dissolution because there no longer is an association that meets 
the definition of partnership. 
You seek to prove too much with your citation of Section 1001(d) 
statement that the LLP survives changes in its membership. If you 
extend that to a partnership reduced to a single partner, why not also 
continue the partnership when the single partner dissociates? A 
partnership without a partner makes about as much sense as a single 
person partnership, and I don’t believe Section 1001(d) addresses either 
of these circumstances. 
Yes, the policy issue of limited liability is important, and we need 
to consider the larger picture here. Individuals who conduct businesses 
as sole proprietors do not enjoy limited liability. The sole proprietor who 
incorporates may secure the benefit of limited liability, but the liability 
shield is not unconditional. Corporate law allows “veil piercing” on a 
number of grounds, including the shareholder’s disregard of formalities, 
co-mingling of personal and corporate assets, and (in some cases) 
significant undercapitalization of the business.84 The limited liability 
company is a much newer organizational option, but it would appear 
that as with the corporation the benefit of limited liability for LLC 
members is not unconditional and may be withdrawn on grounds similar 
to those present in corporate law.85 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. See generally Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81 (2010). 
 85. See, e.g., Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002). 
For the case against LLC veil-piercing, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC 
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Allowing business to be conducted through a single person limited 
liability partnership potentially would make the partnership a more 
effective shield against liability than either the corporation or the limited 
liability company ever could be. Of course, one could argue limited 
liability partnerships should be subject to veil piercing to the same 
extent as corporations and limited liability companies. That presents an 
interesting and broad question that will have to await development in 
another article. For present purposes, it should be enough to observe that 
veil piercing is an undeveloped idea in partnership law. That being the 
case, the conditions under which limited liability protections will be 
disregarded on equitable grounds should not turn on whether the 
partnership has a single partner or multiple partners. 
Perhaps, we have sufficiently developed our differences on the 
status of single person partnerships. Let’s turn our attention to 
developing a framework that accommodates our differing views but 
offers a coherent and practical approach to dealing with single person 
partnerships. 
CONCLUSION: THE BUYOUT AND BEYOND 
A partnership is formed whenever two or more persons voluntarily 
associate in the carrying on of a business without forming some other 
business organization. If they do not by agreement establish a term or 
undertaking, the partnership is at will and must dissolve and liquidate its 
assets upon the dissociation of a partner. If they have agreed to a term or 
undertaking, the partner leaving early may not demand that the business 
be wound up. Instead, the partnership has the right to continue without 
him, provided it buys him out. 
All of that seems straightforward enough, but what if there are only 
two partners and one leaves. Or, what if there are multiple partners and 
all but one leave. RUPA does not specifically address whether the 
                                                                                                                                         
Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 83-84; see also REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. 
ACT § 304(b), 6B U.L.A. 475 (2006) (disregard of formalities is not a ground for 
holding members personally liable); id. § 304 cmt. (b) (“This subsection pertains to the 
equitable doctrine of ‘piercing the veil’ – i.e., conflating an entity and its owners to hold 
one liable for the obligations of the other. The doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ 
is well-established, and courts regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply that 
doctrine to limited liability companies. In the corporate realm, ‘disregard of corporate 
formalities’ is a key factor in the piercing analysis. In the realm of LLCs, that factor is 
inappropriate, because informality of organization and operation is both common and 
desired.”). 
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buyout is available when only one partner remains. A small but growing 
number of courts have concluded that the buyout is not available when a 
single “partner” remains because the buyout is a partnership right and 
the partnership no longer exists.86 These decisions key in on RUPA’s 
definition of a partnership as an association of two or more persons and 
effectively conclude that a two person partnership is dissolved when one 
partner dissociates. 
We agree that the results of these decisions are incorrect. When the 
penultimate partner leaves a term partnership, RUPA’s buyout 
provisions should apply so that the surviving partner gets the benefit of 
the original agreement establishing a term or undertaking for the 
partnership. The means for enforcing the original bargain is the statutory 
buyout. The result we advocate is consistent with the goal of RUPA to 
provide greater business stability to partners who have contracted for it. 
Avoiding mandatory dissolution and winding up is also consistent with 
Section 801, which purports to be an exclusive list of situations that 
trigger a dissolution and winding up. 
Beyond the important point that the buyout is appropriate, we 
disagree on whether the business may continue as a partnership when 
there is only one partner. One of us believes that RUPA’s definition of 
“partnership” makes a partnership with only one member an oxymoron. 
The other believes that a partnership entity can continue with only one 
remaining member. 
In any event, the prospect of a partnership with only one member 
presents interesting questions under RUPA. For example, if the 
partnership was formed as an LLP, could the sole surviving partner 
continue to enjoy the liability shield not available to those who conduct 
businesses as sole proprietors?87 Difficult questions such as this will 
arise if courts reverse recent trends and recognize single person 
partnerships. 
The ambiguous status of single person partnerships under RUPA 
increasingly is the subject of litigation. Courts are likely to continue to 
struggle with the issues deploying both doctrinal and policy analysis. 
They face a daunting task because the statute simply leaves too many 
unanswered questions. Future iterations should address the issue, by 
                                                                                                                                         
 86. See supra note 11. 
 87. Perhaps because of questions like this, the California Bar has recently taken the 
position that an LLP with only one member is not possible. See supra note 11. 
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providing either greater definition of the entity, a clear path to sole 
proprietorship or both.88 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. The Harmonized Uniform Partnership Act was approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2011. It adds to RUPA § 
801’s list of events that cause a dissolution and winding up “(6) the passage of 90 
consecutive days during which the partnership does not have at least two partners.” 
